ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses the relationship between mental phenomena and physical phenomena in respect to what a dependent distinctive relationship could be like between the self and its subvening (base) properties. As far as the laws governing intentional states being reducible to the laws governing physical phenomena are concerned, Lennon uses, as a key point in denying the reducibility of intentional state laws, the principle that 'There must be no explanatory work done by the reduced property which cannot be done by the reducing property'. Lennon indicates, further, that 'law-like bi-conditional links between intentional and physical kinds' are not plausible given the possibility that 'Environments which are physically very different can count as evidence, and behaviour physically very different can constitute the same intentional act'. In order to maintain her materialist position, Lennon ponders the requirement that the subvenient properties are ontologically prior to the supervenient properties. Lennon must also maintain that a distinction exists between supervenience and reduction.
