ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses the metamethodological problem of the epistemic justification of methodological rules. It examines Karl Popper's conventionalist view of the status of methodological rules, and describes the transition from conventionalism via intuitionism to present-day naturalism. The chapter argues that the shortcomings of intuitionism and conventionalism do more than a little to justify the popularity of naturalistic approaches to the philosophy of science. It suggests that Popper takes rules of method to be conventions in both of the two senses of rule and considers Imre Lakatos's critique of Popper. The practice of science existed prior to Popper's proposal of methodological rules for the game of science. The matter is further complicated, by the fact that Popper's proposals for the rules of science are meant to have normative force. The suspicion that Popper fails to account for rational choice of scientific aims is only heightened when Popper turns to the choice between the aims he favours and the aims he opposes.
