ABSTRACT
This concluding chapter (the only one about metaethics) paints in rather broad strokes. First, the need and importance of the Convergence Principle to Parfit’s argument is stated and explained. A fictional example is presented, hereinafter called the Illustration. Eventually, it is meant to serve as a counterexample to the Convergence Principle. Second, the chapter concerns itself with various solutions (these are variations on the Theist’s and Atheist’s Arguments) to the two questions raised by the Illustration. These solutions have a direct bearing on problems related to “the meaning of life.” Some of the doctrines of Bernard Williams, Elizabeth Anscombe, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Arthur Schopenhauer to demonstrate the vulnerability of the Convergence Principle are highlighted. Third and finally, it is shown how and why the views of Kant and Parfit diverge about which actions ought to be performed in the circumstances depicted in the Illustration, actions that are mutually exclusive. These are the actions that are recommended by their respectively different normative or ethical beliefs based on their respectively different normative principles; and these normative principles, of course, explain why their beliefs diverge as to which actions ought to be performed under the circumstances. This will show that, even granting the ideal conditions, the Convergence Claim is a false empirical claim. Contrary to Parfit, we are not all climbing the same moral mountain.
