ABSTRACT
This is the longest chapter, and for good reason. Herein we see the heart of the conflict between the moral doctrines of the two philosophers—Kant and Parfit—played out, and it would not do to do it quickly or cursorily. Even so, the aims of this chapter are fairly circumscribed. Five Kantian theses are laid down, namely, the Proportionality Thesis, the Priority Thesis, the Heterogeneity Thesis, the No Virtue–Happiness Connection Thesis, and, finally, the Human Finitude Thesis. These five theses constitute the Kantian bedrock, providing the essential backdrop. Then Parfit’s Formula of the Greatest Good is presented and evaluated. It is shown why Parfit’s account has serious exegetical problems and also why Parfit’s account of the Proportionality Thesis needs qualification. It is argued that Parfit’s attempt to eke out any interesting consequentialist conclusion from Kant fails.
Next, Parfit’s cardinal argument is examined. The issue of the relationship that Parfit sketches between the Formula of Universal Law and the Formula of Humanity as an End in Itself, on the one hand, and the Formula of the Greatest Good, on the other is raised. Here the five Kantian theses outlined earlier play a particularly significant role. Therein, it is argued, too, that if Parfit’s arguments are sound, then Parfit will have forged an inseparable alliance between consequentialism and deontology. Such a success, surely, would be utterly momentous in the history of moral philosophy. But even granting the correctness of Parfit’s arguments thus far, the question would immediately arise as to how we are to gauge, assess, or determine the effects or consequences of our acts (on which the rightness of those acts depend). To answer that question, Parfit offers three conjectures: The Marginalist View, the Share of the Total View, and The Whole Scheme View. These conjectures are examined, and their consequentialist undertones are made explicit.
