ABSTRACT
Finally, we come to the heart of Parfit’s book (in this and the next two chapters). Parfit is, at last, poised to demonstrate the arch and unquestionably historic thesis of his book, namely, the Ultimate Derivation: consequentialist conclusions can be derived from purely deontological and (non-consequentialist) contractualist premises. This is encased in what Parfit has called the Kantian Argument for Rule Consequentialism (hereafter, the Kantian Argument). First, some indispensable Parfitian preliminaries are stated. There is one preliminary, in particular, that is focused on, namely, the connection between good and right. This is the connection which gives Parfit’s Kantian Argument its distinctive consequentialist flavor. In what follows, an attempt is made to make explicit where, how, and why that connection is invoked in Parfit’s argument. After quoting the whole of Parfit’s Kantian Argument, each premise of that argument is briefly explained. There is a focusing on a premise that, in comparison to others, is of paramount importance. This is premise (E) against which Parfit himself offers four substantial arguments, and then defends that premise against those arguments.
