ABSTRACT
This chapter reviews the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism. This is in order that a modified version of the theory, neo-liberal intergovernmentalism, can be applied to the workings of the European Commission in the case studies of the formulation of a Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on airport ground-handling, and the attempted formulation of a Commission Proposal on slot-allocation. The chapter examines how elite interests may manipulate interest group representation for their own advantage. It traces the theory that elites may not only dominate policy formulation within the state, but may also dominate the behaviour and actions of interest groups. Like A. Moravcsik, Putnam claims that it is the domestic interests that influence a state’s position on a particular issue, as domestic interests must be appeased for a government to retain political power. M. G. Huelshoff argues that interests can be ‘Co-operative’, or ‘Competitive’ in a policy area.
