ABSTRACT
In addition, this was done without any consultation with Iraqis or political parties or professional bodies, which may have given them different advice. Bremer told his staff ‘we would engage responsible Iraqis’ in the deBa’athification process. ‘We do not know Iraq as well as Iraqis do’.9 But this Iraqi ‘engagement’ was kept secret, and no one knows who Bremer consulted, if he ever did. Later, Bremer acknowledged that banning Ba’athists from holding senior official posts was ‘a lot more than inconvenient’ since ‘senior Ba’athists had formed the leadership of every Iraqi ministry or military organization’.10 In fact, this policy caused chaos in Iraqi institutions, and it created enemies for the new regime within the Iraqi people, since there was almost no family that didn’t have a Ba’athist within its ranks. But it also caused hardship and discord among many people. Bremer admitted it was a mistake to let Iraqi politicians be in charge of the implementation of de-Ba’athification.11
