Introduction

Secretary, Kofi Annan, called the establishment of the GC ‘an important first step towards a full restoration of sovereignty’.4 The GC was intended to represent all political, religious, ethnic and regional trends, but it couldn’t in the absence of elections legitimize its existence. It remained connected, perhaps unwittingly, to CPA throughout its term of office. Many important political forces remained outside the GC, such as the Sadrist Trend (ST), several Sunni groups, and the Ba’ath Party (BP) or its successors.5 This is hardly a good start for democracy when major political forces are intentionally excluded. There were suggestions to expand the GC representation to include all groups as a prelude to elections, but Iraqi political groups represented in GC, together with the UN and US, decided to form an interim government to oversee elections for the national assembly and permanent constitution, as demanded by Shia religious leader, Ayatullah Sistani, who insisted on elections to the national assembly.6 This was the first and clearest sign of interference by the religious authority in politics in recent Iraqi history, which paved the way for more of the same in the coming years as we shall see throughout the book. Such interference has enabled religious parties to seize power in 2005 and keep it till the present day. The Governing Council served for just under a year as the country’s unelected legislature. It appointed a government that worked alongside the CPA. It received UN recognition through the UN Security Council resolutions 1483, 1500 and 1511.7 It also took Iraq’s seat at the UN. Many countries, beginning with Iran, recognized it as the representative of the Iraqi state. Real power, however, remained with the Amer ican CPA. GC tried hard to assert its authority. It entered into battles with the CPA, which tried, with marked success, to bypass it. Bremer didn’t implement many GC resolutions and sometimes imposed his will on the GC as happened in the 15th of November Agreement.8 Another organization that played an important role then was the Iraqi Reconstruction and Development Council (IRDC). IRDC was made up of Iraqi exiles who managed different Iraqi institutions but it reported to CPA.9 The core of IRDC was an organization in exile called the Iraqi Forum for Democracy (IFD),10 which aimed to promote liberal democracy in Iraq.11 Working closely with CPA, the GC managed to write and adopt the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL)12 that called for elections on the 30th of January 2005 to elect a national assembly tasked with writing a permanent constitution, getting it approved through a popular referendum on the 15th of October 2005, and then calling for another election based on the new constitution on 15th December 2005. The aim was to put Iraq on the road to legitimate democratic politics as the UN statement of 22 July 2003 called for.13 The UN was involved in the process in order to give it an international legality, but the bombing of its Baghdad headquarters in August 2003, resulting in the death of 22 of its staff, including UN envoy Sergio de Mello, led to distancing the UN from the political process after it closed its bureau in Baghdad. After the formation of the GC, the UN was side-lined by Paul Bremer who rejected all UN proposals to give more power to Iraqis. This US attitude angered the UN

envoy, Mr de Mello, and made him feel bitter as he thought he was used to legitimize the GC and then dropped.14 Elections were held according to the plan set out in the TAL; a 275-member national assembly was elected which subsequently wrote the permanent constitution that was approved by a popular referendum, despite objections to some of its articles by various groups.15 However, most people in the provinces populated by Sunni Arabs rejected the constitution.16 This trend revealed a sectarian-based political divide in the country at that earlier stage. This divide would prove later in the process that it’s a major impediment to democracy. Elections were held again in 2005, 2010, 2014 and 2018 in line with the constitution, parliaments were elected and coalition governments were formed. The US regularly said the elections were largely free and fair with ‘no evidence of widespread or serious fraud’.17 The UN came back to the process and was involved in the preparation and observation of all elections since 2005 after both GC and CPA called upon it to provide assistance.18 Since 2005, Iraq saw three elected prime ministers; one, Noori Al-Maliki, was elected twice (although his second term was questionable). It was a momentous period in Iraq’s history when new political forces emerged. The Islamist parties, previously in opposition to the regime of Saddam Hussein, joined forces and formed the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA). They were also joined by the secular Iraqi National Congress (INC), led by Ahmed Chalabi, regarded by many as the architect of the ‘New Iraq’ because of his perceived influence over the Amer icans.19 The largely Islamist UIA won the first elections on the 30th of January 2005. Interim PM, Ayad Allawi, who had Amer ican and British support,20 did not do so well. He got only 40 seats in the National Assembly.21 This number shrank to 25 seats in the following parliament.22 Since UIA became the ‘biggest bloc’ with 140 seats,23 it was officially asked to nominate the PM. In April 2005, PM Allawi handed over the premiership to PM-elect, Ibrahim Al-Jaafari of the Islamic Da’awa Party (IDP), who was chosen by UIA through an internal vote.24