ABSTRACT
In different debates, and in different philosophical traditions, metaphysical theories have been said to lead to practical (often, moral) conclusions. In some cases, it is argued that we should reject a metaphysical theory because of its unpalatable moral consequences. In other cases, on the contrary, it has been argued that a metaphysical theory has desirable moral consequences. Suppose you accept the no-Self view, defended in the preceding chapter – you, in the sense of an ontologically reified Self, don’t exist. Does this make any difference for the way you (should) live your everyday life, and for the way you (should) relate to others? Does this change your attitude towards your death? After a careful consideration of arguments provided by Parfit and by several Buddhist thinkers, we will see that the reductionist/eliminativist is in the same position as the non-reductionist: existential suffering, say, is independent on the ontology of the Self. Existential suffering is a practical issue, and as such requires a practical approach, exactly as issues concerning legal and moral responsibility – thus, it is not solved or even affected by metaphysical issues.
