ABSTRACT
This chapter demonstrates that a second concrete expression of postwar Japan’s temporal differentiation from prewar Japan was its determination not to become a military great power. This abstention from military power was articulated against a backdrop of Japan’s staggering economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s, and internal and external concerns that Japan might use its economic power to obtain commensurate military power. The chapter shows how Japanese leaders portrayed abstention from military power as something that made Japan unique in a world where economic great powers inevitably became military great powers. It argues that the main Other that this allegedly ‘historic experiment’ was defined in relation to was prewar Japan and its deliberate attempt to turn a ‘rich country’ into a ‘strong military’ [fukoku kyōhei]. Finally, the chapter discusses how this exceptionalism affected concrete security policy by forming the basis for a number of security restrictions. The chapter roughly spans the 1970s and most of the empirical material is derived from the Budget Committee debates of 1972.
