ABSTRACT
The first and most obvious point concerns Aristotle’s account of the ‘practical syllogism’. The supposed problem of akrasia or incontinence is presented as part of a general enquiry into practical reasoning, and Aristotle clearly assumes that practical reasoning is typically a more or less complicated, and more or less conscious, affair. A second important objection to Aristotle’s account of the practical syllogism is that it grossly oversimplifies the process of practical reasoning that it is supposed to formalize. Aristotle’s thought is that, just as anyone who accepts the premisses of a valid theoretical syllogism is forced, on pain of contradiction, to accept the conclusion, so anyone who accepts the premisses of a valid practical syllogism is forced, on pain of contradiction, to accept the conclusion. Although the general outline of Aristotle’s solution is clear, careful examination of details reveals a number of oddities and difficulties.
