ABSTRACT
This chapter begins with outlining this apparent bifurcation, law and substantivalist time and legal temporalities. The former exteriorises time, generally as a standard against which law can ‘measure’. The chapter focuses on a particular type of legal temporality, which has heretofore been referred to as adjudicative temporalities. It considers examples that treat law and time as apparently distinct entities, re-enforcing the substantivalist conceptions of temporality. Adjudicative temporalities, it is argued, produce different types of pasts and futures that structure the facts of a legal case and thus its rendering of the legal subject and legal event rather than this work being done by the legal rule(s). Problematising time and the ways in which time and temporalities are produced by and through law reveal not only the contingency of linear and container time but also the ways in which different temporal constructions are produced in different fields and domains of law.
