ABSTRACT
Afghan politics comes in a number of different forms. One is institutional politics, shaped by the framework of institutions embodied in the Constitution of 2004 and the laws enacted under it. It is, however, a politics marked by centralisation of power in the presidential palace and weak political parties, as well as challenges in the areas of the rule of law and the supply of security. Equally important is network politics, in which informal networks of affinity, in a constant state of reconfiguration and renegotiation, influence the distribution of resources and the exercise of power. A third form is warlord politics, where armed actors position themselves to exercise power either locally or in alliance with elements of the central state. Combined, these leave little space for ordinary Afghans to participate in political life, and this has the effect of driving them in the direction of contentious politics, marked by protests, demonstrations and symbolic political activity. Some of this also takes the form of identity politics, underpinned by social categories such as ethnicity and gender. All of this, of course, takes place in the context of an ongoing insurgency superimposed on ordinary political life, which on the one hand leaves ordinary people despairing about the future, but on the other hand makes popular psychology extremely important as a factor shaping Afghanistan’s future.
