ABSTRACT
The first chapter looks at the military and political crisis in which Egypt found itself after its defeat in the Six Day War, and especially the internal turmoil that shook the leadership in the immediate aftermath of the defeat. As part of the analysis it sketches out the various Egyptian alternatives during that time and examines the political and military steps taken by Egyptian President Nasser, both vis-à-vis Israel and vis-à-vis the United States. The main conclusion is that despite Egypt’s dependence on the Soviet Union for economic assistance and the rebuilding of the Egyptian armed forces, Nasser knew that it was only through the United States that he could set in motion a political process that would end with the return of the Sinai to Egypt. Hence his political and diplomatic maneuvers were derived from this intelligent estimate. However, Nasser’s attempt to manipulate the Americans to exert pressure in his favor, as had happened in 1957, was a major misconception of Egypt’s bargaining power and led to the collapse of the attempts to reach a political settlement in the region.
