ABSTRACT
In the wake of the military escalation in the summer of 1969, the diplomatic arena woke up again after the stagnation that followed the round of talks between the Americans and Soviets in June of that year. This looks at the superpowers’ attempt to find an appropriate formula for negotiations between Israel and Egypt, known as the “Rhodes Formula.” The superpowers endeavored to propose a format for talks between the warring parties similar to what had taken place on Rhodes in 1949. The State Department’s desire to make progress on the political process led it to display a greater willingness to reveal compromise positions in its October 1969 proposal for an agreement, despite the Egyptian and Soviet inflexibility and Israel’s opposition to this flexibility.
The Soviet foot-dragging on the October initiative and the Egyptians’ unwillingness to accept a compromise led Secretary of State Rogers to formulate an independent proposal, in which the State Department displayed its vigorous opposition to the continued immobility. The argument behind this step was that the United States’ standing in the Arab world would continue to deteriorate and that ultimately the country would find itself isolated along with Israel and rejected by the international community. This is why the State Department wanted to take steps that would display the United States in a more favorable light to the other major powers and especially to the Arabs. However the time was not appropriate for such proposals and the warring parties were not willing to accept the principles that were advanced. A series of State Department miscues caused the failure of the Rogers Plan.
