ABSTRACT
Conclusion Chapter encapsulates the findings of the research. It concludes that populism is not a disease, but a symptom of a number of structural constraints which have been so far been neglected, or overlooked, by mainstream political parties in power during the last three decades or so. The picture appears to be much more complex than just being a political anomaly, which needs to be cured. It is a rather systemic problem with much deeper causes. Populist party voters are dissatisfied with, and distrustful of, mainstream elites and, most importantly, they are hostile to immigration and rising ethno-cultural and religious diversity. While these citizens are economically feeling insecure, their hostility springs mainly from their belief that immigrants and minority groups are threatening their national culture, social security, community, and way of life. The main concern for these citizens is not only the ongoing immigration and refugee crisis, they are rather profoundly anxious about a minority group that is already settled: Muslim-origin populations. Anti-Muslim sentiments together with the feelings of nostalgia have become important drivers of support for populist parties. This Chapter also makes a comparative account of the current state of populist parties in Europe with reference to the main characteristics of the populist discourse in terms of the ways in which it is used by both private individuals and political leaders.
