ABSTRACT
In Chapter 2 I accepted the central feature of English law on rape, namely that rape is having sex without consent. In the exploration of the literature on date rape in Chapter 3, consent was frequently one of the important issues. If consent is drawn more narrowly, for example, so that ‘the utmost resistance’ is required (as in some of the older American state legislation) then most of the examples of date rape in Chapter 3 are defined out of existence. Conversely, if various acts such as digital penetration are assimilated to rape, and an expansive view is taken about alcohol so that sex with an inebriated woman is viewed as rape, then the scope of rape becomes much wider. Another important problem is the communication of consent or non-consent. If it is assumed that women consent to sex by, say, going voluntarily to a man’s apartment as part of a date then we have a very different view of rape from one which says that any sex to which there has not been explicit verbal consent is rape. Further, there is the problem of the background situation Consent induced by threats of violence is plainly not consent in the normal sense. Most people would regard consent induced by a threat not to smile for the next twenty minutes as genuine consent. Where between these two do the boundaries lie?
