ABSTRACT
This chapter presents the commonly cited capacities relevant to the possession of personhood and shows that the concept of personhood that emerges can be interpreted as either an "essentialist concept" or a "cluster concept." The cluster version explains why the capacity for autonomy is sufficient for personhood. The chapter argues that chimpanzees are autonomous when autonomy is understood more inclusively. The NhRP's case is based on one particular capacity—autonomy—and for good reason. The philosophical conception of personhood is often framed in terms of autonomy, understood as the ability to act on behalf of oneself, including exercising executive control over the formation of one's goals and the means for achieving them. Contemporary philosophical discussions of personhood offer expanded lists of capacities relevant to personhood. The capacities often cited include: sentience, emotions, autonomy, self-awareness, sociality, language, rationality, narrative self-constitution, morality, meaning-making. The cognitive and affective complexity of chimpanzee life is tied to welfare needs for greater choice and control within captive environments.
