ABSTRACT
Critics of internalism might be inclined to argue that if principles of distributive justice can be generated without reference to the human good, then the internalist strategy should be avoided. In the Critique of Practical Reason, Immanuel Kant declares that moral principles should not be derived from empirically-grounded beliefs about human nature. Although J. Rawls differs from Kant in a number of significant respects, like Kant, his work potentially provides ammunition for those who would mount the constructivist challenge because his principles of distributive justice are ostensibly derived from sources other than the human good. Instead of adopting an internalist approach, Rawls attempts to generate distributive principles from rationalistic foundations. Nonetheless, Rawls’ work can be thought to contain two key neo-Kantian elements: his explicit antagonism to normative principles being derived from the good and; his constructivism or rational foundationalism. The thick theory and the thin theory of the good have different roles to play in the generation of distributive principles.
