Given how anachronistic Aristotle's account of the supreme meta-virtue of megalopsychia (magnanimity) seems to be, there is a tendency to pass over it in silence. This chapter, however, argues against such neglect and maintains that Aristotle's ideal can help illuminate a number of contemporary debates, both internal and external to Aristotelian virtue ethics, that have significant educational reverberations. In moral education, megalopsychia casts light on the levels of moral development, and of flourishing, to which we can aspire through the cultivation of character; the necessary individualisation of virtue and education in virtue; and the nature and limitations of moral-exemplar methodology. In moral philosophy, megalopsychia helps crystallise debates about role moralities, in the context of virtue ethics, and the demands of noblesse oblige; the relationship between objective and subjective well-being; and to what extent contemplation and wonder enter into well-being. This chapter provides a whistle-stop tour of those diverse, but related, topics and explains what Aristotle's account of megalopsychia can teach us about them. The main lesson is that, as the somewhat tragic case of ‘magnanimous philistines’ shows us, moral virtue – even of the highest degree and accompanied by enough resources to become a high-impact public benefactor – does not suffice for flourishing.