ABSTRACT
The most famous argument involving moral disagreement in metaethics aims to establish that relativism/non-objectivism can explain widespread moral disagreement better than objectivism can. But according to J. L. Mackie, the scientific disagreement results from speculative inferences or explanatory hypotheses based on inadequate evidence, and it is hardly plausible to interpret the moral disagreement in the same way. An alternative view about why widespread moral disagreement calls for explanation is inspired by Mackie’s focus on the connection between people’s participation in a way of life (e.g. monogamy) and their moral beliefs matching that the way of the life (e.g. their disapproving of polygamy). Some objectivists respond to Mackie's argument by arguing that moral disagreements are the result of differences in the circumstances in which moral judgments are made and differences in our non-moral beliefs about the consequences of the particular policies or actions.
