ABSTRACT
Many moral philosophers, such as Henry Sidgwick and Derek Parfit, have been concerned with moral disagreement’s implications for the moral claims. Finding ourselves in a disagreement with someone whom the readers know to be their epistemic inferior on that topic seems to have no epistemological implications. Disagreements with our epistemic peers sometimes seem to require us to reduce our confidence in our beliefs. Conciliationism involves an ‘other things equal’ clause: when other things are not equal the people need not suspend belief in light of significant peer disagreement. Steadfast views hold that the people can generally stick to our guns when the people find ourselves in disagreements about whether proposition with those whom the people should judge to be our epistemic peers about whether the proposition. If Elga’s restricted conciliationism were correct, then there would have to be an explanation of why this sceptical pressure is not exerted when the people are in peer disagreements about conciliationism.
