ABSTRACT
Chapters 5–6 discussed how moral disagreement can affect what we are justified in believing. This chapter discusses how what we are justified in believing can affect what we ought to and may permissibility do. It shows that it is plausible that our evidence and justified uncertainty about what we ought to do affects what we ought to do even when our evidence and uncertainty is about moral principles and values. In this case the epistemic implications of moral disagreements for what we can justifiably believe will have implications for what we morally ought to do. What these implications are will depend on the view we should accept about how uncertainty about moral principles and values affects what we ought to do. As this chapter discusses, the most wide-ranging and interesting of these views face serious problems; other views face fewer problems. But this chapter shows that whichever view we accept, disagreements about moral principles and values plausibly have implications for whether we can permissibly eat meat in certain circumstances and the amount that we morally ought to give to charity.
