ABSTRACT
This chapter will describe the six dimensions of moral responsibility out of which the theoretical framework of the book is formulated. The first is about which senses of moral responsibility we are referring to and we need to distinguish between causal responsibility, role responsibility, liability responsibility, and capacity responsibility. The second is about how we should understand the essence of moral responsibility. And we need to differentiate between the cognitive account, the conative account, and the Strawsonian account of moral responsibility. The third is concerned with the criteria by which moral responsibility is ascribed or excused. The two major options are: the consequential account and the merit-based account which would ascribe responsibility on the basis of agents’ possession of the relevant capacity and competence. The fourth is about which face of moral responsibility we are talking about. Distinction is to be made between two faces of responsibility: responsibility as accountability which focus on agents’ capacity to control their values and desires; and responsibility as attributability whose concern is the character exhibited by the agent. The fifth dimension is about the question of standing and we need to differentiate between the conditions where an agent may be judged blameworthy and the conditions where that agent may be subject to active and actual blame. Finally, we need to distinguish between arguments justifying agents being held morally responsible and arguments justifying them to voluntarily assume moral responsibility. That is what we call the ascription side and the assumption side of moral responsibility.
