ABSTRACT
Hanoi was raced with a series of almost equally unattractive alternatives; any effort to match the United States (U.S) in a war of attrition would not only be costly in terms of human casualties and materials. In effect, by the end of 1965 both Washington and Hanoi had decided to exercise the military option to achieve their objectives in South Vietnam. Thanh thus insisted on the need for an aggressive military strategy that would not only harass US and Army of the Republic of Vietnam operations, but also occasionally launch full-scale attacks at regimental size in areas of Hanoi's own choosing. Since the escalation of the conflict in the early 1960s, Hanoi's military strategy had been based on the premise that victory would come as a result of a combined general offensive and uprising. The Tet Offensive broke like a clap of thunder on an astonished world. Certainly that was the case in the United States.
