ABSTRACT

Vietminh weakness seemed clearly reflected in the first exchange of diplomatic feelers between the two sides, for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) clearly appeared more anxious to end the conflict. On the surface, Chinh's analysis was pure Maoism, an almost mechanical application of Chinese techniques to the Vietnamese revolutionary struggle. A meeting of the Party's Standing Committee in January 1948 formally decreed the end of the first stage of withdrawal and the beginning of the second stage of equilibrium. The Communist victory in China and the arrival of Communist military units in the Vietnamese border areas in late 1949 added a new and potentially crucial element to the situation. In Paris, the Vietminh border offensive had made the French dilemma depressingly clear. As with most conflicts that end on a note of compromise, there is an ambiguous quality about the Franco-Vietminh War and its somewhat anticlimactic conclusion.