ABSTRACT

Skeptics have denied it and they have had an influential history. The authors shall, in the light of epistemology, assess the genuine merits of skepticism. Skepticism comes in different depths. Shallow forms deny that we know a few of the things we claim to know, and the deepest form denies that we know anything at all. Deeper forms of skepticism are based on the ubiquitous chance for error. Plain people, who comfort themselves in the snug foothills of accepted opinion, overlook the possibilities for error residing in our most familiar beliefs. Skepticism is defended to win consideration for their own theories. In reply, commonsense philosophers, like Thomas Reid and G. E. Moore, have rejected such speculative theories on the sole grounds that they conflict with common sense. Person who would be trustworthy cannot ignore what virtue demands, and one who conforms to those demands will be trustworthy.