ABSTRACT
The new administration came to power armed with a preconceived doctrine that defined the Central American crisis primarily in Cold War military terms and called for Cold War military solutions. The Honduran military had to be fortified lest revolutionary turmoil in neighboring lands threaten national stability. The Reagan administration's war against the sandinistas was largely predetermined by the ideological zealotry of both sides. As early as the previous summer, the Republican Party convention had adopted a platform calling for the overthrow of the Nicaraguan government. It was one thing to wage "low-intensity conflict" through regional proxies, quite another for one of those proxies to invade its neighbor. In 1980 the Nicaraguans began to provide logistical support training, arms, and advice for the proliferating factions seeking to overthrow the Honduran government. The Honduran government refused to consult Congress and in general treated the whole affair as a fait accompli.
