ABSTRACT
Although they recognized that the position of the GVN in Hau Nghia and some other "hard-core" provinces, such as Binh Dinh and Long An, was still precarious at the beginning of 1968, American political and military leaders generally were pleased with the apparent course of the war. They believed that US military pressure was slowly forcing enemy main force units away from the populated areas. Americans anticipated that ARVN and territorial forces increasingly would be able to defend the cities, "secure" rural areas, and extend government control farther and farther into Front territory. Indeed, the Tet Offensive is seen here as the turning point of the war, leading to the destruction of President Johnson and, ultimately, to US withdrawal. The validity of this analysis is widely accepted but not self-evident: American resolve was plummeting before Tet, and it is difficult to see why it was to Hanoi's advantage to force out a war leader as miserable as Lyndon Johnson.
