ABSTRACT
The Honolulu sessions deliberately focused on finding solutions for South Vietnam's social, political, and economic problems. In October 1965, after the administration had decided to send American combatants to South Vietnam, Chester Cooper argued again for a single executive empowered to manage American nonmilitary programs. The arrival of American forces stabilized the military situation, but pacification, all observers recognized, was in trouble. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam felt uncomfortable with civilians heading province advisory teams, and some civilians in turn were dismayed at the idea of military officers managing civil programs. An unwavering advocate of more funds and personnel for nonmilitary programs, Robert Komer was convinced practically from the first of the need to increase the United States Army's involvement in pacification. In the face of unyielding opposition from the State Department and the embassy as well as Agency for International Development and the Central Intelligence Agency, the president postponed a decision but decided to keep open the military option.
