ABSTRACT

This chapter explores the increasingly prolific work in moral and political philosophy which has challenged the traditional focus on autonomous, abstract, rational agent and on 'justice' as the first virtue of society. It examines the work of feminist theorists who have developed what is known as 'the ethics of care'. The chapter addresses three central controversies surrounding care. First, the debate over alleged 'essentialism' of much theorizing about care, which embraces the question of whether there can be such a thing as a morality of and for women. Second, the debate between 'justice' and 'care', which addresses the alleged incommensurability of two perspectives and asks whether an adequate moral theory must, or indeed can, include elements from both. Third is over whether 'care' describes what is essentially a personal moral response, in that, it relies on relationships between particular individuals and ignores the wider moral implications of social structures and institutions, which may be largely responsible for exclusion and suffering.