ABSTRACT
This chapter offers art account of the role that interpretive theory plays in constitutional interpretation. Some view the task of constitutional interpretation as almost at one with moral philosophy, while others believe that the words of the text are the recurring constraint. Some insist that majoritarian democracy should be the guiding principle of constitutional interpretation, while others reject any pre-occupation with the "counter-majoritarian difficulty". A non-redundant conception of constitutionality, therefore, presupposes the possibility of decisions that are all-things-considered right but unconstitutional, and decisions that are all-things-considered wrong but still constitutional. Within the class of second-order reasons, the subclass of constitutional reasons is uniquely related to questions of separation of powers, in the non-constitutional and non-technical sense of that term. American constitutional law, there are multiple legitimate, unordered sources, and then interpretive occasions arise whenever the indications of such sources are in conflict.
