ABSTRACT
A theory of interpretation will bear some relation to a theory of meaning. This chapter outlines Hans-Georg Gadamer's views on interpretation. It begins with his relation to Edmund Husserl and the problem of epistemological realism. The chapter then turns to Gadamer's efforts to subordinate the theory of interpretation to a theory of truth. It discusses his specific dependence on Martin Heidegger's conception of ontology and the problem of circularity and prejudgment in interpretation. The chapter focuses on Jurgen Habermas's epistemological writings and within those writings specifically his criticisms of Gadamer, Husserl, and Heidegger. Habermas has produced in the course of the last four decades an extraordinary body of work stretching from sociological research to philosophy. Though Habermas's specific criticisms of Gadamer do not appear to be very clear or persuasive, he offers an epistemological defense of interpretation quite distinct from what we have seen in Gadamer.
