ABSTRACT
In 1993, the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) formally requested the Agency’s Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation to make proposals for tightening the safeguards regime and making it more efficient. To optimise safeguards-relevant information, the IAEA is improving its analysis methods. Sources of information include that provided in Expanded Declarations, noted by inspectors, available from open-source material and from environmental monitoring. Increased use of no-notice and complementary inspections aims to expand the IAEA’s options to address doubts or inconsistencies at an earlier time, and in an atmosphere that builds confidence and is not politically charged. Nuclear-capable states might have broader reservations that information about their nuclear-weapon activity could be obtained, though the IAEA’s only objective would be to verify that locations open to inspection were for exclusively peaceful purposes. European Atomic Energy Community conducts nuclear safeguards among EU states and the IAEA verifies their application.
