ABSTRACT
The Italian aggression of Greece ranks among the most neglected campaigns of the Second World War. Benito Mussolini envisaged the campaign as a complement to the ongoing North and East African campaigns against the British Empire but also as a means to balance Hitler’s ambitions in the Balkans. For Mussolini and the military, it was the bitter conclusion of a political and military fiasco, with dire consequences. Recent accounts of the war portray – usually briefly, superficially, and through the usual Anglo-German bias – the failed operation as the demonstration of Mussolini’s limitations as a war leader. The 176-day operation was the shortest of Mussolini’s wars if one leaves out the one against the French forces in the Alps. In a matter of days, many divisions found themselves entangled in perilous tactical situations, exposed to inhospitable weather and facing the unexpected determination of the Greek soldiers. The chapter also presents an overview of the key concepts discussed in this book.
