ABSTRACT
This chapter shows that failing command structures in Rome and Tirana contributed in different ways to the failure of the RE. When Benito Mussolini decided to enter the Second World War, he was determined to play his role of commander-in-chief of operating forces, at the displeasure of the king. The last of Mussolini’s flaws as a war leader, his inefficiency as commander-in-chief of operating forces, appeared when he emptied the forze armate’s command structures of their potential effectiveness. Overall, even before the end of the campaign, Mussolini’s failure as commander-in-chief was obvious. When Mussolini chose General Soddu to become the commander-in-chief of the Comando Superiore Forze Armate Albania on 9 November, he expected a reversal of fortune. Despite Mussolini’s unrealistic hope for an offensive in early January 1941, the commander-in-chief was still dealing with localised, but violent, enemy actions against the frontline.
