ABSTRACT
This chapter probes how this political-financing system persists, even with regular party changes in government. To survive in an environment of high income uncertainty, Ghanaian contractors rely on income diversification and kinship-based reciprocity. Most Ghanaian contractors have side businesses—for example, construction supply—that they rely on for revenue when they are not receiving contracts, such as when a particular party is out of power. Additionally, when a contractor receives (“wins”) a contract from a politician, she may subcontract portions (e.g., plumbing and electricals) to contractors who are loyal to opposition parties. This subcontracting provides income stabilization for the initial contractor: when her party loses power, she can count on those other contractors, through kinship norms, to help her when they get contracts. However, subcontracting to opposition members helps finance other political parties, keeping them viable while out of power. Because contractors live close to subsistence and are focused on income stabilization, they are less willing to risk merging or investing in their firms, ultimately reducing the quality of construction.
