ABSTRACT
In this chapter I explain what in my view are better routs to condemn the farm animals’ sector and in general animal exploitation. I argue that sentience is a queer metaphysical notion and as such it is not very convincing. Granted, moral philosophers seem to be comfortable talking about sentience and its cognates. However, the idea of veganism is a practical philosophy and does not benefit from highly intellectual metaphysical discussion. Here I propose that the notion of animal suffering—which is the number one argument for veganism and against animal exploitation—is not conducive to veganism. I propose two arguments that work better than sentience: 1) an aesthetic-based argument showing that animal products involve undermining aesthetic values in the world and gratuitous violence; 2) a gustatory-based argument showing that animal products are not consumed for their inherent taste; and what is not consumed for its inherent taste is deceiving, and thus should be avoided.
