ABSTRACT
Before discussing India’s defence policy in the post-1971 period, it is essential to review the Indian defence production and nuclear programme. The former demonstrates the extension of the technological infrastructure to country’s defence needs and unquestionable quest for self-sufficiency in all defence-related areas. The competing claims to India’s scarce resources necessitated that India’s defence policy be formulated in the context of the country’s economic development programme. India defence planners and political elites were well aware of the reality that sudden and massive increases in the defence outlay may be counter-productive as these may trigger off a chain reaction in the defence spending of Pakistan and China. Considering its structural and systematic dependency, India as a non-nuclear state has relied more on the silent than expressive forms of decision-making in the nuclear field. Hence, India’s nuclear goals can be better understood if the working decisions of the government are analysed rather than going by the explicit proclamations by the Indian leadership.
