ABSTRACT
The defence policy of India was determined by the interaction of external strategic pressure created by changes in the strategic environment in South Asia and India’s foreign policy and defence capabilities. Two decisions were seminal: one, the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty on August 09, 1971; and two, the decision to explode an underground nuclear device. By taking advantage of the enhanced military capabilities and the weather conditions, the Indian Army demonstrated the effectiveness of its deterrence posture towards China which was vastly superior in manpower, even without a nuclear retaliatory force. In any case, Indian nuclear policy-making can be evaluated by considering the cost factor of producing a nuclear deterrence force, on the one hand, and the returns in nuclear investments for civil applications, on the other. By considering the total overall expenditure on developmental plans between 1950–1980 and considering the percentages of allocation under various heads, one can speculate on the possibility of a nuclear deterrence posture.
