ABSTRACT
In 2018, Myanmar’s government strove to counter the international isolation that followed the fallout from the Rohingya crisis. It did so by building closer relations with China, India and Russia, among others, in 2018. The Myanmar government has in turn rejected the Federal Political Negotiation Consultative Committee (FPNCC’s) agenda and authority as an umbrella organisation and remains adamant in its refusal to change the constitution. The Tatmadaw’s willingness to sit with the FPNCC demonstrates the strength of the alliance and China’s strong backing of the group. Beijing’s role as peace broker is significant and is key to any lasting agreement. Various and overlapping causes drive Myanmar’s web of armed conflicts. While some are uniquely historical, others are emerging as a result of the country’s transition to civilian government and broader economic development. The tension between the centre of Myanmar and its periphery that drives today’s conflict was instituted in colonial times and reinforced through subsequent political structures.
