ABSTRACT
In this last chapter I attempt to systematically summarize and expound the conclusions I reached in the preceding chapters and so offer a certain defence of the principle of double effect. First, I explain and defend a moral asymmetry between hysterectomy and craniotomy and show how the principle of double effect can be invoked to explain this asymmetry. Next I critically evaluate James Rachel’s arguments against moral relevance of intentions and I also address Thomas Scanlon’s concerns raised against the direct moral relevance of intentions. Then I introduce Frances Kamm’s principle of triple effects and attempt to show that and why advocates of the principle of double effect should consider Kamm’s examples of applicability of her principle as morally impermissible. Next I deal with the infamous problem of closeness and show how it could be tackled within the framework I laid out in the previous sections of this chapter. Finally I discuss some examples of the application of the principle of double effect and further explain the conditions that human acts must meet to be licit under the principle.
