ABSTRACT
In my monograph I aimed to defend the following three theses:
It is impossible to speak of one principle of double effect. Various formulations have appeared in history, which are not merely different ways of expressing the same principle. The individual formulations are set in certain ethical contexts, in which they can play and often do play different roles. To speak of “the principle of double effect” is historically inadequate.
The first formulation of a deliberation based on the principle of double effect – on balancing the moral admissibility of actualizing an action having good and bad consequences – appears in the work of the Dominican philosopher and theologian, Thomas Aquinas.
The principle of double effect in the form I give it in the last chapter of my work is still a controversial moral principle; its assumptions (the ethical requirement of taking into account the intentions of agents in the ethical evaluation of their actions) are especially controversial. If these assumptions are accepted, then the principle of double effect appears to be a rational way of justifying certain actions.
