ABSTRACT
This chapter takes further the consideration of theories of power by looking at theories that particularly stress the ways in which interests are aggregated and collective action involves interest groups. It has two halves, one exploring rational choice theory, the other looking at perspectives on the roles of groups and networks.
Rational choice theory involves the application of notions from economics (and to some extent from mathematics) to the analysis of the way in which self-interested behaviour by individuals may influence the policy process. It suggests that predictive propositions can be derived from generalisations which equate self-interest and rational behaviour and assume that they will be dominant. It assists the analysis of the policy process by reminding us of the importance of self-interest and of the extent to which public policy problems emerge from the incapacity of market mechanisms to solve many collective action problems.
This body of theory is built around the notion of there being a political ‘marketplace’. In this context, collective action problems have been analysed from an economic perspective, principally to assist with the development of prescriptive approaches, but in ways which also help with the analysis of the development of public policies. Game theory, with its roots in mathematics rather than economics, is then briefly examined as a further extension of that approach.
Developments of rational choice theory include the economic theory of bureaucracy and principal-agent theory which are also examined. These are seen as theoretical approaches which contribute to insights about the behaviour of public sector bureaucrats, particularly when modified in ways which retain the concern to stress self-interested behaviour but show that they may lead to varied predictions of the way in which actual behavioural choices will be structured.
In the second half of the chapter, attention will be given to approaches to the modification of pluralism which accepted the force of criticisms that emphasised power inequalities and saw the system of power as in various respects structured, without at the same time accepting either the very unitary vision of much Marxist work or going very deeply into the sources of structuration. These approaches to the examination of the policy process stress the extent to which interest groups are aggregated 52into networks or policy communities to provide more coordinated systems of power. They include an approach initially developed by Paul Sabatier, the ‘advocacy coalition framework’, to offer a particular challenge to models of the policy process that analyse it in terms of separate stages.
The chapter ends with a consideration of a body of theory which can be seen as in many respects a precursor of network theory, the theory of (neo-)corporatism. While it will be argued that much of this theory has been discredited, neo-corporatist tendencies can still be identified in the policy-making systems of many countries.
