ABSTRACT
Any rate part of the task of countering ethical relativism consists in the elaboration of a satisfactory normative ethical theory 'flanked by an adequate meta-ethical analysis'. Indeed, granted that a suitable account of morality can be supplied, there is every reason to expect that such an analysis applies also to logically attributive uses of ‘good’ in moral contexts also. Before the meaning of 'morally ought' is considered, it is necessary to attempt to understand the general concept of morality. If moral practices, systems and rules are presented, it becomes possible to explicate the 'ought'’ of morality. This chapter presents a wide range of disagreement in moral matters, both between individuals and between societies. For it recognises as a morality a system of beliefs which would or could be defended by reference to irreducible interpersonal reasons (i.e. to intrinsic value); and no a priori limits can be set to the number of such systems.
