ABSTRACT
There could be many different ways of life which are all worthwhile in terms of manifestations of the distinctive human endowment. Life and the necessities which sustain it are not themselves of intrinsic value. If they were, then the most miserable, tortured or dehumanised of human lives and the most stunted of nonhuman lives would still warrant perpetuation and replication, and that simply as lives. But they are plainly the preconditions of whatever makes life worthwhile, and of whatever in a life is of value in itself. Pleasures as pleasures have not been argued to be necessary for living well, but, being of intrinsic value, plainly they enhance the quality and worthwhileness of a life. Indeed it has been maintained that the gratification inherent in the development of certain capacities, such as that for self-respect, adds to their value. Length of life is not required for a life to be worthwhile or flourishing, as capacities can be fulfilled without it.
