ABSTRACT
Three-quarters of a century have passed since the Bretton Woods conference established an institutional framework for a postwar world order. Much has changed since that time, with the steady, remarkable rise of China during the past four decades being one of the most notable and fundamental examples. China’s rise to a position of eminence among nations is significant not just for its magnitude and speed. As a country with fundamentally different historical, cultural and political perspectives from Western liberal democracies, it now challenges many of the precepts of the order that nurtured its rise. In some cases, China continues to work in good faith within such institutions, but it clearly does not feel obliged to do so in all cases. The Belt and Road Initiative is an important example of where China has set out to establish a parallel or rival set of institutions and activities that appear to be designed to extend its economic and geopolitical influence throughout much of Asia, while also furthering its national security agenda. At the same time, China is grappling with some significant fraying at the edges of its own internal order, notably in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang. The primary foreign relations policy challenge for United States posed by these developments is to envision, articulate, implement, and provide essential leadership for a so-called World Order 2.0 that can best accommodate its own core interests while also eliciting meaningful, good-faith participation from its core allies and, if possible, from China as well. Ultimately, success in doing so will be predicated upon the ability to demonstrate first, at home, what the U.S. stands for, and by that example serving once again as a beacon for others.
