ABSTRACT
Some philosophers believe that it is through the concept of ‘decision’ that we understand the nature of morals. Decision no doubt is a fact of very first importance in our practical moral experience. To use moral concept thus is to imply a pro-attitude, and it is this that differentiates a moral concept from a theoretical one. The ordinary rational method of advancing factual reasons where disagreement is rooted in someone’s ignorance of such reasons, and persuasive method for cases which show disagreement in attitude and not in belief. The command theory of morals originates with the realization that ethical sentences are closely bound up with our actions in a way in which purely descriptive sentences are not. In an ethical judgment like ‘people should tell the truth’ we are concerned not with descriptions of things that have happened or may happen but with judging that conduct of certain kind (truth-telling) rather than another (telling lies) is preferable in human speech.
