ABSTRACT
Karl Popper’s critical rationalism, the subject of inquiry in this chapter, reveals the impact of Popper’s epistemology on defining critical rationalism merely as a moral attitude of openness to criticism rather than as a theory of rationality. This chapter shows that Popper’s philosophy of science is not enough to rescue his critical rationalism from justificationism due to the lack of an alternative epistemology for the justified true belief account of knowledge. Firstly, the question of how Popper’s epistemology is shaped in response to the problem of objective knowledge is addressed. It is then argued that Popper situates the philosophy of science at the core of his epistemology in order to provide a non-justificational answer to the question of objective knowledge. Finally, the essence of Popper’s critical rationalism on the basis of his epistemology of science is described. In sum, the primary purpose of this chapter is to present a critical review of Popper’s critical rationalism in regard to its epistemology of science.
