ABSTRACT
This chapter suggests the non-justificationist epistemology to be used for reinventing the philosophy of critical rationalism in the subsequent chapter. The argument is made that a new philosophy of knowledge may be formulated on the basis of the logic implied in the non-justificationist philosophy of science: scientific hypotheses can be objective knowledge, not because they are justifiable, but because they are falsifiable. Our claims of knowledge, whether metaphysical or scientific, are shown to be able to be objective, not because they are justifiable, but because they are refutable. The separation between justification and criticism is applied at three levels to present a non-justificationist theory of knowledge: (i) the level of objective knowledge as unfalsified conjecture, (ii) the level of the premises of a rational argument as fallible and (iii) the level of the inference form of a rational argument as unjustifiable, but valid. In this way, the chapter presents a non-justificationist alternative for the epistemology of justified true belief.
